The BB84 protocol is a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol that ensures the security of the key generation process against eavesdropping. It was proposed by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984, hence the name BB84. The protocol utilizes the principles of quantum mechanics to establish a secure key between two parties, commonly referred to as Alice and Bob, while detecting the presence of an eavesdropper, commonly referred to as Eve.
The BB84 protocol employs the properties of quantum superposition and uncertainty principle to protect the key generation process. It involves the transmission of quantum bits, or qubits, over a quantum channel. These qubits can be represented by various physical systems, such as photons or atoms, but for simplicity, let's consider the case of photons.
In the BB84 protocol, Alice prepares a random sequence of qubits, each representing a bit of the key. Each qubit is encoded in one of four possible states, chosen randomly from two non-orthogonal bases: the rectilinear basis (horizontal/vertical polarization) and the diagonal basis (45°/135° polarization). For example, Alice could encode the bit '0' as a photon polarized horizontally in the rectilinear basis, or as a photon polarized at 45° in the diagonal basis.
Alice then transmits the encoded qubits to Bob through the quantum channel. However, due to the properties of quantum mechanics, any attempt by Eve to eavesdrop on the transmission will introduce errors. This is known as the no-cloning theorem, which states that it is impossible to create an identical copy of an unknown quantum state.
Upon receiving the qubits, Bob randomly chooses one of the two measurement bases for each qubit. For example, if Alice encoded a qubit in the rectilinear basis, Bob may choose to measure it in the diagonal basis. Bob's choice of measurement basis is kept secret from Alice.
After performing the measurements, Bob publicly announces the bases he used for each qubit. Alice then reveals the bases she used to encode each qubit. Bob and Alice discard the qubits where their measurement bases did not match. This is known as the sifting process.
Next, Alice and Bob compare a subset of their sifted bits over a public channel. This comparison allows them to detect the presence of an eavesdropper. If the error rate is below a certain threshold, they can be reasonably confident that their key is secure. If the error rate exceeds the threshold, they abort the protocol and start over.
Finally, Alice and Bob perform error correction and privacy amplification to distill a final shared secret key. Error correction corrects any remaining errors, while privacy amplification ensures that even if Eve has partial information about the key, the final key is secure.
The BB84 protocol ensures the security of the key generation process against eavesdropping through the principles of quantum mechanics. By encoding qubits in non-orthogonal bases and detecting errors introduced by an eavesdropper, Alice and Bob can establish a secure key while detecting the presence of Eve.
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